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NOTES 
A PROPOSAL FOR CALCULATING 
REIMBURSED VICTIMS OF FINANCIAL 
IDENTITY THEFT UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 18, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit issued an opinion in United States v. Yagar interpreting the 
“victims” calculation table of Title 18, Section 2B1.1 of the United States 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Section 2B1.1).1 At issue was whether an 
individual bank account holder who was fully reimbursed for financial 
losses incurred as a result of financial identity theft should be counted as a 
“victim” at sentencing under Section 2B1.1(b)(2).2 This scenario was not 
explicitly addressed in Section 2B1.13 when Yagar was decided and the 
Sixth Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to address the issue.4 The Yagar 
Court held that “victim,” as defined by Application Note 1 of Section 
2B1.15 (Application Note 1), did not contemplate a person who was “fully 
reimbursed for their temporary financial losses” and “suffered no adverse 
effect” as a result of the crime.6 Six months later, in United States v. Lee, 
the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit’s reading of Application 
Note 1, and held that individual account holders are counted as “victims” 
under Section 2B1.1(b)(2), regardless of whether they have been 
reimbursed for their losses.7 
Over the next four years, Yagar and Lee were established as seminal 
decisions representing the majority and minority viewpoints of an ever-
widening circuit split.8 Despite the split, and the serious implications of the 
interpretation of this section,9 the Supreme Court declined to address the 
                                                                                                                           
 1. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 2. Id. at 969. For the purposes of this note, “financial identity theft” will refer to any form of 
financial fraud covered by Section 2B1.1 that involves the access or use of an individual’s bank 
account without his or her knowledge or consent. 
 3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2004). 
 4. See Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. 
 5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2004). 
 6. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. 
 7. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 8. See Jacqueline Harrington, Comment, “Once Victim, Always Victim”: Compensated 
Individuals Under the Amended Sentencing Guidelines on Fraud, 108 MICH. L. REV. 445, 449–50 
nn.22–23 (2009). See also United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162 
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Icaza, 492 
F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 9. For a discussion of hypothetical scenarios that demonstrate the importance of resolving the 
reimbursed issue circuit split, see, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 451–55; Ryan N. Parsons, 
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reimbursed victims issue10 and the Federal Sentencing Commission 
(Commission) ultimately resolved it pursuant to its statutory authority.11 
The Federal Sentencing Commission is required to “review and revise” 
provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) periodically 
in response to the “observations, comments, or questions” of various federal 
agencies.12 In order to address the circuit disagreements over the proper 
interpretation of “victim” in Section 2B1.1—and after making a request for 
public comment13—the Commission published a proposed amendment to 
Application Note 1 on May 8, 2009.14 The proposed amendment provided 
that “for purposes of the victims table in subsection [2B1.1](b)(2), an 
individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without 
authority is considered a ‘victim’ . . . [but this amendment] cover[s] only 
those individuals whose means of identification are actually used.”15 
Congress had until November 1, 2009 to reject this proposed amendment, 
but declined to do so, rendering it immediately effective.16 
The Commission’s amendment is reflected in the Guidelines as 
Amendment 726 of Title 18, Appendix C (Amendment 726).17 
Significantly, by mandating that reimbursed account holders whose means 
of identification were used to perpetuate a fraud be included in the Section 
2B1.1(b)(2) “victims” calculation,18 Amendment 726 implicitly adopted 
Lee’s minority viewpoint and definitively settled the circuit split.19 
                                                                                                                           
Note, Temporary Victims: Interpreting the Federal Fraud and Theft Sentencing Guideline, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 845, 852–53 (2009). 
 10. See, e.g., Adjei v. U.S., No.07-2295, 2009 WL 405680 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2009), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2070 (2009); Wyman v. United States, 427 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1221 (2006). 
 11. See Notice of the Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United 
States Courts, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,750, 21,751 (May 8, 2009). 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006). 
 13. See Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 
74 Fed. Reg. 4,802, 4,806 (Jan. 27, 2009) (requesting “comment regarding whether § 2B1.1 
adequately accounts for a case in which an individual suffers pecuniary harm, but the pecuniary 
harm is immediately reimbursed by a third party”); see also United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 
51, 58 n.12 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 14. See Notice of the Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United 
States Courts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 21,751. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, 
Amend. 726 (2010). 
 17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, Amend. 726 (2010). 
 18. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 448. 
 19. Every account holder who has been reimbursed for their losses due to financial identity 
theft will inherently have had their means of identification used unlawfully or without authority. 
See id. Therefore, consistent with Lee, they will always be counted as a “victim” under Section 
2B1.1. See id. at 450, 450 n.23; see also Shawn P. Ayotte, Comment, Balancing Proportionality 
and Deterrence: The First Circuit’s Definition of “Victims” of Identity Theft in United States v. 
Stepanian, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 264 (2010) (noting that the outcomes of Lee and 
Amendment 726 “are essentially the same: both treat individual cardholders as ‘victims’ of 
identity theft”). 
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This note will discuss the opinions issued during the four-year circuit 
split and argue that Amendment 726 is an improper resolution of the 
reimbursed victims issue for three reasons: (1) it will work contrary to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ stated goal of proportional sentencing by 
employing an overbroad presumption that all reimbursed account holders 
suffer harm through time lost seeking reimbursement for financial identity 
theft;20 (2) it fails to provide a mechanism for calculating time lost seeking 
reimbursement as a “pecuniary harm,” which, at sentencing, results in a 
calculation of “victims” under Section 2B1.1(2) before a calculation of 
“actual loss” under Section 2B1.1(1);21 and (3) it allows for the possibility 
of “double-counting” the financial losses suffered by “victims” of financial 
identity theft. 
Part I of this note will discuss the legislative intent behind the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, their operating structure, and the effect that the 
Supreme Court’s decision United States v. Booker22 had on their 
application. Part II will provide an overview of various forms of financial 
identity theft that can implicate the reimbursed victims issue. Part III will 
explain how “actual loss” and the number of “victims” of financial crimes 
are tallied under Section 2B1.1(b), and how determining whether to include 
reimbursed account holders frustrates these calculations. Part IV will 
examine the cases that defined the circuit split and demonstrate how 
Amendment 726 falls short of resolving the issues raised. Part V will 
propose a solution to the reimbursed victims issue in the form of an 
alternative amendment that does not count reimbursed account holders as 
“victims”—based on Yagar’s reasoning that reimbursed account holders do 
not always suffer an “adverse effect”—but utilizes an upward departure 
application to account for the harm that some account holders suffer 
through time lost seeking reimbursement for financial identity theft. This 
proposed amendment will promote the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ goal 
of proportional sentencing as well as remedy the erroneous operation of the 
2B1.1(1) “actual loss” calculations and the risk of “double-counting” the 
financial losses of “victims” of financial identity theft that exist under 
Amendment 726.23 
                                                                                                                           
 20. See Public Hearing Before the United States Sentencing Commission 37 (2009) (statement 
of Jennifer Coffin, National Sentencing Resource Counsel, Federal Public and Community 
Defenders), available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/agendas/20090317/transcript.pdf [hereinafter Public 
Hearings]. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 22. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker is a landmark Supreme Court 
decision that held that mandatory application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is 
unconstitutional. Id. at 250. As discussed in Part I infra, since Booker was decided, the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are only considered in an advisory capacity. 
 23. But cf. Harrington, supra note 8, at 451 (arguing that retribution for financial identity theft 
is “best satisfied by treating only compensated individuals as victims”); Parsons, supra note 9, at 
864 (arguing that account holders who spent time seeking reimbursement should be counted as 
“victims” and their lost time should be included in the “actual loss” calculation). 
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I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES POST-BOOKER 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a creation of the United States 
Sentencing Commission, an independent judicial agency charged with 
“establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal 
justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed 
guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of 
federal crimes.”24 Under the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the Commission was granted 
broad authority to develop federal sentencing guidelines that would “further 
the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just 
punishment, and rehabilitation.”25 
The Commission submitted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
Congress on April 13, 198726 and they became effective November 1, 1987 
after a period of mandatory Congressional review.27 As originally enacted, 
the Guidelines contained mandatory sentencing provisions under which a 
defendant’s term of imprisonment was calculated through a cross-reference 
of 43 “Offense Levels” and 6 “Criminal History Points.” Each Level and 
Point is reflected in the X- and Y-axes of the Guidelines’ Sentencing Table, 
respectively.28 Thus, the Sentencing Table considers the severity of a crime 
in the context of the defendant’s criminal history.29 
                                                                                                                           
  Parsons advocates for an amendment that adopts the reasoning of the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008). Parsons, supra note 9, at 869. Abiodun 
held that a reimbursed account holder is a “victim” under 2B1.1 “if—as a practical matter—they 
suffered (1) an adverse effect (2) as a result of the defendant’s conduct that (3) can be measured in 
monetary terms.” Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 168−69. Parsons asserts that in articulating the “Abiodun 
test,” the Second Circuit “clearly went beyond Yagar’s holding” because Yagar did not speculate 
as to what situations would qualify a reimbursed account holder as a “victim,” whereas Abiodun 
states that “any time” a reimbursed account holder suffers an “adverse effect measurable in 
monetary terms” they are a “victim” under 2B1.1. Parsons, supra note 9, at 863. This contention is 
erroneous. In fact, as stated by the Second Circuit, Abiodun is entirely consistent with Yagar. See 
Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 168. The Abiodun test was not novel and did not construct a new “test” of 
any sort. Rather, it was merely a concise articulation of how “victims” are calculated under 
Section 2B1.1(b)(2). Namely, an individual is a “victim” if they suffer “loss” (adverse effect), and 
“loss” is defined as “pecuniary harm,” which is harm that is readily measurable in money (can be 
measured in monetary terms). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) 
(2010); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.2. Moreover, Yagar explicitly found that the 
reimbursed account holders at issue in that case had “suffered no adverse effect” because their 
“monetary loss was short-lived and immediately covered by a third-party.” United States v. Yagar, 
404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, Yagar had no cause to speculate on examples of what 
situations would qualify a reimbursed account holder as a “victim.” Further, such speculation 
would have been ill-advised—the methods employed to commit financial identity theft, the harms 
they cause, and the relative amounts of time required to rectify them, are too numerous and varied 
for speculation. 
 24. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2010). 
 25. Id. § 1A1.2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. § 5A Sentencing Table (2010). 
 29. See id. § 1B1.1. 
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The relative assignment of sentence ranges to Levels was developed 
using empirical data from numerous relevant sources, including the United 
States Parole Commission’s guidelines and statistics, 10,000 presentence 
investigations, and the elements of various substantive criminal statutes.30 
This methodology is intended to limit the parole board’s power in 
determining the actual length of an offender’s prison term, promote a 
uniform system where like crimes receive like sentences, and maintain 
proportionality between the severity of a crime and the sentence imposed.31 
However, deviation from the Sentencing Table is permitted when a court 
finds that a recommended sentence range does not adequately reflect the 
crime committed. In such instances a court may adjust the recommended 
sentence through an upward or downward “departure.”32 
Departures are principally permitted when the sentencing court “finds 
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 
different from that described.”33 The Guidelines delineate two forms of 
departures: (1) departures pursuant to “specific guidance . . . by analogy or 
by other numerical or non-numerical suggestions”; and (2) “unguided” 
departures—which include “grounds [for departure] not mentioned in the 
guidelines.”34 Significantly, of the two forms of departure, the Commission 
“expects that most departures will reflect the suggestions” and unguided 
departures are to remain “highly infrequent.”35 
While the Guidelines continue to use this methodology—with an eye 
towards the same legislative goals—their authority “changed dramatically” 
after the 2005 Booker decision.36 In Booker, the Supreme Court held that, 
under the Sixth Amendment, only facts admitted to the jury or proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt can be considered for sentence calculations, and 
therefore the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Guidelines were 
unconstitutional.37 As a result, Booker “changed the federal sentencing 
                                                                                                                           
 30. Id. § 1A1.3. 
 31. Id. Amendment 726 fails to promote the Guidelines’ goal of proportionality in sentencing 
for financial identity theft crimes because it equates the harm suffered by account holders who 
were immediately reimbursed for their losses to those who spent great time and effort seeking 
reimbursement. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006). 
 33. Id. Application Note 19(A)(vi) of Section 2B1.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors 
for sentencing courts to consider as warranting “Departures” from the Sentencing Table in cases 
involving unlawful use of means of identification. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.19(A)(vi) (2010). It does not list time lost seeking reimbursement as a factor 
justifying an upward departure. Id. 
 34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (2010). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Andrew Nash, Note, Victims By Definition, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1419, 1434 (2008). 
 37. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250–52 (2005). 
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guidelines from mandates to advice”38 and judges are no longer bound to 
follow them; however, “the Commission believe[s] sentencing courts 
should still be giving ‘substantial weight to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines in determining the appropriate sentence to impose.’”39 
Accordingly, “post-Booker sentencing [is not very] different from pre-
Booker sentencing,” and federal judges routinely abide by the sentencing 
structure of the Guidelines.40 Thus, whether mandatory or advisory, the 
Guidelines steer the hand of sentencing judges, and the significance of their 
construction in securing (or failing to secure) proportional sentencing 
remains as critical as it was pre-Booker. 
II. FINANCIAL IDENTITY THEFT AND THE EFFECTS OF 
REIMBURSEMENT 
Financial identity theft crimes can be perpetrated in various ways, but 
traditionally “the most common ways to become the victim of identity theft 
are through the loss or theft of a purse or wallet, mail theft, and fraudulent 
address changes.”41 These methods give perpetrators of financial fraud 
crimes access to their victims’ personal information, such as “checkbook[s] 
bearing account numbers, Social Security Numbers . . . and business 
records.”42 
[After] the perpetrator has obtained personal information, that person will 
open a bank account in the victim’s name (or access a current account). 
The perpetrator will then begin depositing fraudulent, worthless or 
counterfeit checks into the account. Most deposits are carried out via 
automated teller machines (ATMs). Before checks are cleared, the 
perpetrator will withdraw cash on the account via ATMs. . . . In some 
instances, the fraudster will deposit empty envelopes, with a dollar amount 
annotated, into an ATM.43 
More recently, fraudsters have begun perpetrating financial identity 
theft by “skimming” account information and PIN numbers—often directly 
from electronic payment terminals or ATM machines.44 A common method 
employed to skim ATM machines is 
                                                                                                                           
 38. Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Federal Sentencing After Booker, 17 FED. SENT. R. 291, 
291 (2005). 
 39. Id. (quoting Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 18 (2005) (statement of Honorable Ricardo Hinojosa, 
Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission)). See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 259; Harrington, supra 
note 8, at 446 n.5. 
 40. Berman, supra note 38, at 292. 
 41. THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS TIPS & ISSUES: ISSUE 2, at 15 (2001), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_02.pdf#page=17. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Automated Theft Machines, TIME, Jan. 17, 2011, at 53, 54. 
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using plaster or clay to make a molding of the front of an ATM. Then they 
build a plastic facade, ‘sanded down and spray-painted to match the 
machine so that it is virtually undetectable,’ . . . 
The facade is used to hide a magnetic-card reader, which can be purchased 
online. Typically, a video camera is concealed in a light fixture or 
brochure holder overlooking the keypad, although occasionally the device 
used to capture the PINs is not a camera but a fake key panel overlaid on 
the real pad.45 
Due to the prevalence of such criminal practices, financial institutions 
frequently absorb financial losses from unauthorized transactions.46 
Accordingly, for the purposes of calculating “victims” under Section 
2B1.1(b)(2), banks and other financial institutions that have reimbursed 
their clients for these losses are considered to be individual “persons” at 
sentencing.47 Since they bear the ultimate pecuniary loss for such crimes, 
counting these financial institutions as “victims” is a logical calculation. 
This logic, however, does not transfer as easily when counting reimbursed 
individuals as “victims” under Section 2B1.1(b)(2). 
III. ARE REIMBURSED ACCOUNT HOLDERS “VICTIMS”? 
Section 2B1.1 governs sentencing for financial identity theft and other 
financial crimes such as larceny, embezzlement, fraud, and various 
counterfeit offenses,48 and “recommends heavier sentences when larger 
numbers of victims suffer a pecuniary loss as a result of the offender’s 
criminal conduct.”49 This method seems, and is intended, to provide a 
consistent and comprehensive blueprint for judges at the time of sentencing. 
However, determining who qualifies as a “victim” under Section 
2B1.1(b)(2) has complicated this foundational premise.50 
Prior to the adoption of Amendment 726, “victim” was defined by 
Application Note 1 as “(A) any person who sustained any part of the actual 
loss determined under subsection (b)(1); or (B) any individual who 
sustained bodily injury as a result of the offense.”51 Under Section 
2B1.1(b)(2), a defendant’s recommended sentence is increased relative to 
the number of “victims” affected by her crime. A two-Level increase is 
                                                                                                                           
 45. Id. (quoting Kim DeLeo, FBI Supervisory Special Agent). 
 46. One study estimated the cost of such losses to be $11 billion in 2009. See LEXISNEXIS, 
2009 LEXISNEXIS TRUE COST OF FRAUD STUDY 6, 19 (2009), http://www.riskfinance.com/ 
RFL/Merchant_Card_Fraud_files/LexisNexisTotalCostFraud_09.pdf. 
 47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010) (“‘Person’ includes 
individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies.”). 
 48. Id. § 2B1.1. 
 49. Nash, supra note 36, at 1436 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2B1.1(b)(2) (2007)). 
 50. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 447–48. 
 51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010). 
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triggered by a crime involving 10 or more victims;52 a four-Level increase 
is triggered by a crime involving 50 or more victims;53 and a six-Level 
increase is triggered by a crime involving 250 or more victims.54 “This 
sliding scale of enhanced punitive liability is one of the ‘key compromises’ 
of the Guidelines, under which an offender’s recommended sentence 
increases with the magnitude of the crime but not in direct proportion to 
it.”55 
A defendant’s recommended sentence is also enhanced relative to the 
amount of “actual loss” incurred by the “victims” of her crime.56 Section 
2B1.1(b)(1) defines sixteen categories of summed “actual loss” and 
recommends relative sentence enhancements57 ranging from no 
recommended increase in sentencing for “actual loss” of $5,000 or less58 to 
a thirty-Level increase for “actual loss” totaling more than $400,000,000.59 
The definition of “actual loss” was not altered by Amendment 726 and is 
defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from 
the offense.”60 “‘Pecuniary harm’ means harm that is monetary or that 
otherwise is readily measurable in money.”61 “‘[R]easonably foreseeable 
pecuniary harm’ means pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under 
the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential result of 
the offense.”62 In sum, under Section 2B1.1, “a person is the victim of a 
crime if he or she suffers ‘actual loss,’ which is in turn defined as 
‘pecuniary [harm].’”63 
Identifying “victims” under Section 2B1.1(2) and the “actual loss” 
ascribed to them under Section 2B1.1(1) is problematic in the case of 
reimbursed account holders because an injury sustained as a result of 
financial identity theft is often wholly alleviated when they are reimbursed 
by a bank or other financial institution. Often banks are able to detect such 
offenses and reimburse account holders before they are even aware of their 
losses.64 In these instances, it may be argued that because the account 
holder does not suffer a quantifiable harm, he should not be included in the 
                                                                                                                           
 52. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 53. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). 
 54. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). 
 55. Nash, supra note 36, at 1436 (citation omitted). 
 56. Critical to this calculation is that the “actual loss” be incurred by a “victim” of the crime. 
See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how Amendment 726 violates this constructional mandate). 
 57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010). 
 58. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(A). 
 59. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P). 
 60. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i). 
 61. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii). 
 62. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv). 
 63. Nash, supra note 36, at 1439. This note argues that time lost seeking reimbursement is not 
readily measurable in dollar amount, therefore it is not a “pecuniary harm,” and should not be 
reflected in the 2B1.1B(b)(1) “actual loss” calculations. 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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“victims” calculation.65 However, in other instances, the dollar amount 
stolen and subsequently reimbursed is not representative of the crime’s 
injurious effects because financial identity theft imparts not only monetarily 
quantitative, but qualitative harm as well.66 Victims of identity theft may 
endure intense emotional impacts of victimization such as rage, betrayal, 
powerlessness, frustration, or even fear for their physical safety.67 
While the Federal Sentencing Commission affirmatively excluded 
consideration of emotional impact as a pecuniary harm under Section 
2B1.1,68 noticeably absent from Application Note 1, or any of the 
application notes supplementing Section 2B1.1 prior to Amendment 726’s 
implementation,69 was whether fully reimbursed account holders have 
suffered an “actual loss” and should therefore be included in the “victims” 
calculation.70 Without this elucidation, federal judges were left without 
proper guidance as to what constitutes pecuniary harm for a financial 
identity theft offense and whether a reimbursed account holder should be 
counted as a “victim” under 2B1.1(b)(2).71 This led to differing 
interpretations of “victimhood” among judges and “inconsistent 
adjudications of similar fact patterns.”72 As a result, criminal defendants 
charged with financial identity theft under Section 2B1.1 could receive 
significantly different sentences depending upon the circuit in which they 
were charged, an outcome in direct conflict with the Guidelines’ goals of 
uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.73 
The Commission sought a remedy to this shortcoming during a Public 
Hearing on Proposed Amendments held in 2009.74 Eric Handy, a 
                                                                                                                           
 65. See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 9 (suggesting that reimbursed account holders who suffer no 
adverse affect should not be included in the “victims” calculation). 
  An argument can be made that once an account holder’s financial information has been 
unlawfully disseminated, due to the insidious nature of financial identity theft crimes, they are at 
risk of suffering a future harm that will not be taken into account at sentencing and they should 
therefore be included in the “victims” calculation. However, the inclusion of a victim who has not 
yet suffered any harm in a sentencing calculation is both contrary to the Guidelines’ goals of 
proportional sentencing and is a constructional error under Section 2B1.1. See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 66. See IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 2008, at 18 
(2008), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/Aftermath_2008_20090520.pdf. 
 67. See id. at 32–33 tbl.22. This is often directly related to the many months or years they 
spend repairing the harm they have suffered as a result of financial identity theft. See id. at 19 
tbl.10; see also Public Hearings, supra note 20, at 90 (statement of Eric Handy, Mid Atlantic 
Coast Representative, Identity Theft Resource Center). 
 68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii) (2010) (“‘Pecuniary 
harm’ means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measureable in money. 
Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include emotional distress, harm to reputation or other non-
economic harm.”). 
 69. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. nn.1–4. 
 70. Harrington, supra note 8, at 451. 
 71. Nash, supra note 36, at 1439. 
 72. Id. at 1438. 
 73. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Public Hearings, supra note 20, at 12–13 (statement of Michael Dubose, Chief, Comp. 
Crime & Intel. Prop. Sec., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice). 
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representative for the Identity Theft Resource Center, advocated for the 
categorical inclusion of reimbursed account holders in the “victims” 
calculation75 and testified to the hardships endured by people attempting to 
restore their identities once their accounts have been compromised by 
financial identity theft.76 Jennifer Coffin, staff attorney for the National 
Sentencing Resource Council of the Federal Public and Community 
Defenders, argued in favor of implementing a departure application—as 
opposed to a Guidelines amendment—to address the reimbursed victims 
issue.77 The Commission found Handy’s testimony persuasive and, in May 
2009, submitted a proposed amendment (ultimately Amendment 726) to 
Section 2B1.1 embracing his argument. 
Amendment 726 is intended to account for the lost time that reimbursed 
account holders suffer attempting to repair the damage done to their 
identities,78 and to cure future inconsistencies in “victims” calculations 
among the federal circuits.79 It provides that: 
The Commentary to § 2B1.1 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in 
Note 4 by adding at the end the following: 
“(E) Cases Involving Means of Identification.—For purposes of 
subsection (b)(2), in a case involving means of identification 
‘victim’ means (i) any victim as defined in Application Note 1; or 
(ii) any individual whose means of identification was used 
unlawfully or without authority.”80 
In conjunction with these changes, Amendment 726 “move[d] the 
definition[] of ‘means of identification’ . . . to Application Note 1”81 so it is 
now in close proximity to the definition of “victim.”82 “‘Means of 
identification’ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7), 
except that such means of identification shall be of an actual (i.e., not 
fictitious) individual . . . .”83 Title 18 Section 1028(d)(7)(D) includes 
“access device (as defined in section 1029(e))” as a definition of “means of 
identification.”84 
                                                                                                                           
 75. See id. at 26 (statement of Eric Handy, Mid Atlantic Coast Representative, Identity Theft 
Resource Center). 
 76. Id. at 23–26. 
 77. Id. at 65 (statement of Jennifer Coffin, National Sentencing Resource Counsel, Federal 
Public & Community Defenders). 
 78. See id. at 88–90 (statement of Eric Handy, Mid Atlantic Coast Representative, Identity 
Theft Resource Center) (testifying to studies conducted by the Identity Theft Resource Center that 
demonstrate that account holders often spend great amounts of time repairing their identities). 
 79. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, Amend. 726, at 309–10 (2010). 
 80. Id. at 307. 
 81. Id. at 310. 
 82. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010). 
 83. Id. 
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (2006). “Access device” is defined as: 
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The Commission’s effort to remedy the reimbursed victims issue 
through Amendment 726 effectively cured future inconsistencies in 
“victims” calculations, but 2B1.1 still suffers from an inherent lack of 
proportionality in sentencing.85 Instead of having their “victims” calculation 
depend upon the federal circuit in which they are brought to trial, 
defendants now face the possibility of disproportionate sentencing due to an 
overbroad presumption that the account holders affected by their crime 
spent significant amounts of time seeking reimbursement for their financial 
losses.86 This approach creates inequitable disparities, as revealed by the 
issues that arose during the four year circuit split. 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines had not contemplated the 
reimbursed victims issue, the omission of consideration of reimbursed 
account holders in Section 2B1.1 and the shifting curative ability of 
reimbursement proved to frustrate the sentencing calculations of judges 
who were attempting to determine what qualifies for “victimhood” under 
Section 2B1.1.87 Prior to the ratification of Amendment 726 in November 
2009, at least nine federal Courts of Appeal had issued opinions on the 
proper interpretation of Application Note 1 and the reimbursed victims 
issue.88 Although Yagar and Lee established what were to become the 
majority and minority viewpoints of the debate,89 the depth of the inquiry 
expanded in subsequent opinions and no clear standard evolved among the 
circuits prior to the adoption of Amendment 726 for defining who is a 
“victim” of financial identity theft. While the reasoning among the circuits 
was divergent and appeared to suggest disproportional sentencing for 
financial identity theft crimes, in reality, judges were reaching decisions 
that resulted in proportional sentencing.90 
                                                                                                                           
any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile identification 
number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service, 
equipment, or instrument identifier, or other means of account access that can be used, 
alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or 
any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a 
transfer originated solely by paper instrument). 
18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) (2006). 
 85. See Parsons, supra note 9, at 864. 
 86. See Public Hearings, supra note 20, at 37 (statement of Jennifer Coffin, National 
Sentencing Resource Counsel, Federal Public and Community Defenders) (stating that, “by 
adopting [Amendment 726], the Commission would create a wholesale presumption [that 
reimbursed account holders spend significant amounts of time seeking reimbursement]”). 
 87. See Nash, supra note 36, at 1441. 
 88. See cases cited supra note 8. 
 89. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 449–50. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009) (account holders were 
counted as “victims” and there was evidence that many had been significantly inconvenienced due 
to temporary loss of funds); United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 2009) (account 
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Generally, each Court of Appeals addressing the issue considered 
whether or not the individual account holders had spent significant time or 
effort seeking reimbursement and ultimately reached a sentencing decision 
that proportionally reflected the harm they had suffered.91 Notably, in 
United States v. Kennedy, the Third Circuit proclaimed that it did not 
believe a circuit split even existed on the reimbursed victims issue.92 While 
this assertion was erroneous,93 it is telling of the reality that the federal 
circuits were assigning “victims” Level enhancements that were in 
proportion to the harm suffered by reimbursed account holders, despite 
inconsistencies in their reasoning.94 Such an equitable outcome is now 
precluded by the overbroad presumption mandated by Amendment 726,95 
but would remain possible with an amendment that adopts Yagar’s 
reasoning coupled with an upward departure application that contemplates 
time lost seeking reimbursement in lieu of counting reimbursed account 
holders as “victims.” 
In Yagar, the Sixth Circuit held that reimbursed account holders whose 
losses were short-lived were not to be counted as “victims” under 
2B1.1(b)(2), but included a “qualifying explanation,”96 which contemplated 
that a “victims” calculation was ultimately a fact sensitive determination 
dependent upon whether or not the individual account holders had actually 
suffered any “adverse effect.”97 
                                                                                                                           
holders were not counted as “victims” and the government had failed to prove they had sustained 
any loss); United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 2009) (account holders were not 
counted as “victims” and the government had failed to prove that they even knew their funds had 
been stolen before they were completely reimbursed); United States v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 719 
(9th Cir. 2008) (account holders were not counted as “victims” and the government did not prove 
that their losses were not “short-lived”); United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 
2008) (account holders were counted as “victims” and it had been shown that they spent an 
“appreciable amount of time securing reimbursement”); United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 
491 (5th Cir. 2008) (account holders were not counted as “victims” and they had been quickly 
reimbursed for the improper charges on their accounts); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 811, 895 
(11th Cir. 2005) (account holders were counted as “victims” and they had “suffered considerably 
more than a small out-of-pocket loss and were not immediately reimbursed by any third party”); 
United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005) (account holders were not counted as 
“victims” and their monetary loss was short-lived and immediately covered by a third party). 
 91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 92. Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 421. 
 93. The Third Circuit’s commentary in Kennedy on the reimbursed victims issue reveals that it 
failed to address the fundamental distinction of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Lee: reading the 
Credits Against Loss provision to be an inherent acknowledgement of an initial loss to the 
individual account holder. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. The Third Circuit equated the Eleventh 
Circuit’s recognition of distinguishing facts between Yagar and Lee to be tantamount to an 
acceptance of Yagar’s analysis, when, in fact, the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally opposed Yagar 
on this issue. See Parsons, supra note 9, at 856 n.96. 
 94. See Parsons, supra note 9, at 854–55. 
 95. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
 96. United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 97. See United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). In contrast, the First and 
Eleventh Circuits read the Credits Against Loss provision to contain an implicit recognition that 
2011] Calculating Reimbursed Victims 459 
The effect Amendment 726 would have on the reasoning employed by 
the Circuits in cases that addressed the reimbursed victims issue will be 
discussed next. This should reveal the inadequacies of Amendment 726 for 
promoting sentencing proportionality, and the intrinsic errors mandated by 
its construction. Amendment 726 will not promote sentencing 
proportionality because time lost seeking reimbursement will be equated for 
every account holder whose means of identification was used as a result of 
financial identity theft, regardless of whether they actually lost any. 
Amendment 726’s constructional errors arise because it counts the 
“victims” of a financial identity theft crime under Section 2B1.1(b)(2) 
before conducting an “actual loss” calculation under Section 2B1.1(b)(1), 
and because it allows for the possibility of double-counting financial losses. 
A. THE STARTING POINT: YAGAR & LEE 
The circuit split on the reimbursed victims issue first arose in the 2005 
Yagar and Lee opinions.98 Yagar, the first circuit court opinion to address 
the reimbursed victims issue99—and the resultant majority viewpoint100—
held that reimbursed account holders are not necessarily always “victims” 
under the definition of Section 2B1.1(b)(2);101 conversely, Lee,102—which 
became the minority position103—declined to adopt Yagar’s reasoning and 
held that reimbursed account holders are categorically “victims.”104 At its 
core, this dispute effectively concerned the question of when a court should 
calculate the number of “victims” for a crime under Section 2B1.1.105 The 
Yagar court calculated the number of “victims” based on their relative 
position at the time of trial,106 whereas the Lee court calculated the number 
of “victims” at the instant the crime was committed.107 This is a simplified, 
yet critical, distinction. A court calculating “victims” based on their relative 
position at trial is able to consider the curative effects of reimbursement, 
whereas a court calculating “victims” at the moment a financial identity 
                                                                                                                           
reimbursed account holders are always “victims.” See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895; United States v. 
Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 98. See supra Introduction. 
 99. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. 
 100. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 449, 449 n.22. 
 101. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. 
 102. Lee, 427 F.3d at 894. 
 103. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 450 n.23. 
 104. Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. 
 105. Compare Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971 (holding that account holders are not considered 
“victims” when their monetary loss is short-lived and immediately covered by a third party, rather 
than defining them as “victims” the moment the crime is committed), with Lee, 427 F.3d at 895 
(holding that the Credits Against Loss provision of Section 2B1.1 inherently recognizes that 
reimbursed account holders are “victims” because they have suffered a loss at the moment the 
crime is committed). See also Nash, supra note 36, at 1441. 
 106. See Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. 
 107. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. 
460 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
theft crime is perpetrated will automatically include each account holder in 
the “victims” calculation, regardless of whether they have spent any 
significant time or effort seeking reimbursement.108 
In Yagar, the defendant had been convicted of a bank fraud scheme in 
which she used stolen checks from thirteen different bank accounts and 
stolen information from over fifty individuals’ bank accounts to steal 
almost $90,000.109 At sentencing in district court, the defendant received a 
two-Level enhancement under Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) for a crime involving 
more than ten “victims.”110 On appeal, both the United States and the 
defendant argued that this was an improper calculation of the number of 
“victims” involved in the crime. The government’s position was that a four-
Level enhancement was appropriate under Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (fifty or 
more “victims”) because even though they were later reimbursed, more than 
sixty different individuals temporarily lost money as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct.111 Conversely, Yagar argued that the five banks who 
reimbursed the account holders were the only entities that suffered “actual 
loss” and, therefore, none of the reimbursed account holders should be 
counted as “victims.”112 The Sixth Circuit found for the defendant on the 
reimbursed victims issue, holding that the individual account holders 
affected were not to be counted as “victims” at sentencing, and rejected the 
government’s position that “‘[t]here is no limitation as to when the actual 
loss must exist’” under the Guidelines.113 The Yagar court reasoned that the 
account holders had not suffered any “adverse effect” because their losses 
were “short-lived and immediately covered by a third-party.” Therefore, 
they had not suffered any “actual loss” or “pecuniary harm,” and thus were 
not “victims.”114 Yet, the Yagar court recognized that there could be 
situations in which reimbursed account holders do suffer an “adverse 
effect,” and the qualifying explanation reflects this. 
Although the account holders at issue in Yagar were not found to be 
“victims,” the Yagar qualifying explanation stated that “there may be 
situations in which a person could be considered a ‘victim’ under the 
Guidelines even though he or she is ultimately reimbursed.”115 The Yagar 
line of reasoning thus left open the possibility for another court to find 
reimbursed account holders to be “victims” under 2B1.1(b)(2) without 
conflicting with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis. It is this distinction that 
allowed Yagar’s reasoning to ensure uniform sentencing proportionality 
                                                                                                                           
 108. See id. 
 109. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 968. 
 110. Id. at 967 (counting as “victims” the five banks and six account holders who had to 
purchase new checks because of defendant’s scheme). 
 111. Id. at 970. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 971. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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that would not be possible under Lee, and is not now possible under 
Amendment 726. Neither Lee nor Amendment 726 allow a sentencing 
judge to consider whether a reimbursed account holder has suffered any 
adverse effect as a result of the time they lose seeking reimbursement. 
In Lee, defendants Lee and Wyman were prosecuted for cashing “more 
than one million dollars’ worth of personal checks drawn upon closed bank 
accounts” in a private offset exchanges scheme116 that attempted to draw 
upon money held by the United States Treasury.117 The Lee court held that 
the account holders at issue had suffered harm seeking reimbursement for 
their losses, and factually distinguished the account holders from those in 
Yagar, because the account holders in Lee had spent considerable time 
pursuing legal remedies for their losses and there were no third parties 
readily available to reimburse them.118 The Lee court also took direct issue 
with Yagar’s reading of Section 2B1.1, holding that it was erroneous not to 
read the “Actual Loss” provision of Application Note 3(A)(i)119 with the 
“Credits Against Loss” provision of Application Note 3(E)(i).120 Under 
Lee’s reading of these provisions, reimbursed account holders are always 
counted as “victims” due to the “initial loss” they suffer when their 
identities are stolen.121 
The Credits Against Loss provision states that “loss” should “be 
reduced” by “[t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the 
property returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other 
persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense 
was detected.”122 The Lee court reasoned that the inclusion of the word 
“victim” in the Credits Against Loss provision was an “inherent . . . 
acknowledgement that there was in fact an initial loss, even though it was 
subsequently remedied by recovery of collateral or return of goods.”123 
                                                                                                                           
 116. Private offset exchange schemes arise out of a 
commercially unrecognized system rooted in the notion that the United States Treasury 
amasses moneys rightfully belonging to individuals. Private offset exchanges were 
claimed mechanisms for individuals to access this Treasury-held money. Using closed 
checking accounts, an individual would write a check to obtain a good or service. As 
these checks were written on closed accounts, the account on which the check was 
drawn could not provide the funds to pay for the goods. Instead, these offset checks 
were theoretically to be presented to the Treasury by the drawee bank or payee for 
reimbursement with the stockpiled funds. 
United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 895. 
 119. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i) (2010). 
 120. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i). 
 121. Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. 
 122. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 123. Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. See also United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56–57 (1st Cir. 
2009) (citing United States v. Cornelius, Nos. 06-10727 & 06-10763, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26975, at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2006)). 
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Lee’s reasoning thus nullified the effect that reimbursement can have upon 
the “victims” calculation, and automatically counted each account holder 
who had been affected by the crime. Thus, for the purposes of promoting 
sentencing proportionality, Yagar’s reasoning is superior to that of Lee 
because the Yagar qualifying explanation allowed a sentencing court to 
consider whether or not an account holder had suffered a pecuniary harm 
seeking reimbursement,124 whereas the Lee court’s reasoning allowed for no 
such inquiry and categorically defined reimbursed account holders as 
“victims.”125 
Had the Yagar court been confronted with the facts of Lee, it likely 
would have included the reimbursed account holders in the “victims” 
calculation, despite applying a different interpretation of Section 
2B1.1(b)(2). As noted by the Lee court, “the monetary losses suffered by 
these parties were neither short-lived nor immediately covered by third 
parties” and “unlike the individual account holders in Yagar, [Lee’s] 
victims suffered considerably more than a small out-of-pocket loss and 
were not immediately reimbursed by any third party.”126 Thus, this would 
logically place Lee’s “victims” within the circumstances alluded to in the 
Yagar qualifying explanation where “a person could be considered a 
‘victim’ under the Guidelines even though he or she is ultimately 
reimbursed.”127 However, the reverse is not true. Based on Lee, had the 
Eleventh Circuit been presented with the facts of Yagar, it would have 
reached an opposite conclusion on the reimbursed victims issue than did the 
Sixth Circuit. The Lee court’s reading of the Credits Against Loss provision 
categorically defines reimbursed account holders as “victims” under 
2B1.1(b)(2), irrespective of whether or not their losses were short-lived or 
did not cause any “pecuniary harm.”128 Thus, the 2B1.1(b)(2) “victims” 
calculation under Lee was prone to disproportionate outcomes because it 
could not take into account whether an account holder had actually suffered 
any “pecuniary harm” despite being reimbursed. By adopting Lee’s 
minority viewpoint in Amendment 726,129 so too has the Federal Sentencing 
Commission perpetuated outcomes that are in conflict with the Guidelines’ 
goal of promoting sentencing proportionality. This is further demonstrated 
by the circuit opinions that followed Yagar and Lee. 
                                                                                                                           
 124. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. 
Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 125. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. 
 128. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. 
 129. Amendment 726 makes no mention of the proper reading of the Credits Against Loss 
provision, but the practical effect of the Amendment is identical because an account holder will be 
counted as a victim under 2B1.1(b)(2) regardless of whether or not they have suffered any 
pecuniary harm. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, Amend. 726 (2010). 
See also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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B. YAGAR AND LEE APPLIED 
Circuit opinions on the reimbursed victims issue generally adopted 
either the position of Yagar or Lee.130 The majority of these opinions were 
consistent with Yagar, whether or not they held that the reimbursed account 
holders at issue were “victims.”131 The Yagar line of opinions held that 
account holders who were quickly reimbursed and did not suffer any 
“pecuniary harm” or “actual loss” were not “victims,” but employed 
reasoning that would count as “victims” those account holders who were 
not quickly reimbursed and suffered “pecuniary harm” as a result.132 In 
contrast, the Lee line of opinions held that reimbursed account holders are 
always “victims,” notwithstanding the effects of any reimbursement.133 
As previously discussed, Amendment 726 has implicitly adopted Lee’s 
reasoning. The folly of this is three-fold: (1) Lee’s reasoning allows for the 
possibility of disproportionate sentencing by equivocating the harm 
suffered by account holders who lost time seeking reimbursement to those 
who did not; (2) Lee’s reasoning includes account holders in the “victims” 
calculation based on the harm they suffer seeking reimbursement without 
providing a mechanism for including this harm in the “actual loss” 
calculation; and (3) Lee’s reasoning allows for the possibility of double-
counting financial losses caused by financial identity theft. 
1. Proportional Sentencing 
Of the courts that found that the reimbursed account holders at issue 
were not “victims,” most reasoned that they did not suffer any “actual loss” 
or “pecuniary harm” when their monetary loss was “short-lived and 
immediately covered by a third party.” This argument, first articulated in 
Yagar,134 was embraced by the Fifth,135 Ninth,136and Tenth137 Circuits. As 
demonstrated by the account holders at issue in these opinions, victims of 
financial identity theft do not necessarily spend any significant amount of 
time seeking reimbursement for their losses.138 
                                                                                                                           
 130. See Nash, supra note 36, at 1439–41. But see Parsons, supra note 9, at 853 (asserting that 
there were three distinct lines of opinions within the reimbursed victims issue circuit split). 
 131. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 449. 
 132. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 133. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 134. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 135. See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Here, the account holders were reimbursed by third parties (as in Yagar), and the 
Government does not point to evidence that any account holder had to spend money or 
an extended length of time seeking reimbursement. We do not have to reach the issue of 
whether the parties counted as “victims” under our rule. 
Id. 
 136. United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 137. United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 138. Amendment 726 therefore creates an erroneous presumption in light of these cases. 
464 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
The Fifth Circuit followed Yagar’s reasoning in United States v. 
Conner.139 In that case, defendant Whately had purchased goods at Home 
Depot stores and charged them to the accounts of multiple companies 
without authorization.140 In the district court, Whately’s base offense was 
increased four Levels under Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because he had 
unlawfully charged his purchases to the accounts of between 50 and 250 
different companies.141 On appeal, the Conner Court cited Yagar142 and 
reversed the 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement143 because the affected account 
holders had been fully and quickly reimbursed for the unauthorized charges 
on their accounts,144 and thus had not suffered any “pecuniary harm.”145 In 
reaching this decision, the Conner Court stressed that “pecuniary harm” is 
harm that resulted from the offense and stated that it did not see any reason 
why the court should “‘stop the clock’ immediately after the credit accounts 
were used, as opposed to measuring pecuniary harm following the events 
that actually took place, including the crediting of the accounts by the 
issuers of credit.”146 
In United States v. Pham, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth in adopting 
Yagar’s reasoning and remanded a case involving a scheme where the 
defendant had “created fraudulent driver’s licenses and other identifying 
documents and orchestrated counterfeit check cashing activities, the 
proceeds of which were then deposited in his bank account or the account 
of another scheme leader’s girlfriend.”147 The Pham court held that the 
individual account holders were not “victims” and stated that “[i]f the 
account holders victimized by Pham were fully reimbursed as soon as they 
notified their banks of the fraudulent activity, then they cannot reasonably 
be said to have suffered or ‘sustained’ the losses that were only temporarily 
and fleetingly reflected in their accounts.”148 The Pham Court also 
distinguished its account holders from those in Lee, because in Lee the 
account holders were not reimbursed by their banks and recovered their 
losses “from the defendants themselves.”149 
The Third Circuit’s first opinion on the reimbursed victims issue was 
decided in United States v. Kennedy in early 2009.150 Defendant Kennedy 
was a “representative payee liaison” of a non-profit corporation that assisted 
                                                                                                                           
 139. See Conner, 537 F.3d at 491. 
 140. Id. at 483. 
 141. Id. at 488. 
 142. Id. at 489. 
 143. Id. at 492. 
 144. The Conner court declined to address whether these account holders would have properly 
been counted as “victims” if they had spent time and effort seeking reimbursement. Id. at 491. 
 145. Id. at 489, 491. 
 146. Id. at 490. 
 147. United States v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 148. Id. at 719. 
 149. Id. at 720. 
 150. See United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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elderly people in managing their finances.151 She utilized her access to her 
client’s financial accounts to write fraudulent checks and steal over $50,000 
from thirty-four individual account holders152—all of whom were 
reimbursed before they were aware that their funds had even been stolen.153 
The Kennedy court, adopting Yagar’s reasoning, held that because the 
affected account holders were reimbursed by Kennedy’s employer and its 
insurer, they had not sustained any part of the “actual loss” and thus were 
not “victims” as defined by Section 2B1.1(b)(2).154 
The Tenth Circuit addressed the reimbursed victims issue in May 2009 
and sided with Yagar and its progeny in United States v. Orr.155 Defendant 
Orr had compromised the credit card numbers of over seven hundred 
individual accounts by “‘min[ing]’ credit card data ‘through the use of 
skimming devices,’ ‘download[ing]’ the credit card data ‘into a computer to 
create fraudulent credit cards,’ and then us[ing] the fraudulent credit cards 
‘at retail stores to purchase high end items.’”156 When it addressed the 
reimbursed victims issue, the Orr court found that the government had 
failed to carry its evidentiary burden of proving that the account holders 
affected by Orr’s scheme had not been fully reimbursed, and it was thus 
error to include them in the “victims” calculation at sentencing.157 
In contrast to Yagar, Pham, Conner, and Orr—where the account 
holders at issue did not expend significant time or energy seeking 
reimbursement for their losses—the Third,158 Second,159 and First160 Circuit 
Courts of Appeal addressed the reimbursed victims issue while presented 
with account holders who had not been immediately reimbursed for their 
losses and suffered an adverse effect as a result. As in Lee, the Courts of 
Appeals in each case held that time lost seeking reimbursement was a 
“reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm” and therefore those account 
holders were to be included in the “victims” calculation. Thus, inclusion of 
these “victims” at sentencing was in proportion to the harm caused by the 
crime. However, as demonstrated below, in contrast to the First Circuit,161 
the Third and Second Circuits reached conclusions that are compatible with 
the Yagar decision because they did not hold that all reimbursed account 
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holders are counted as “victims.” Instead, the courts ruled only that the 
account holders at issue in each case had suffered harm despite being 
reimbursed; therefore, they could each fall within the circumstances 
suggested by the Yagar qualifying explanation. 
In United States v. Abiodun, defendant Abiodun had purchased roughly 
four to five hundred stolen credit reports downloaded from the internet by a 
third party, and committed credit card and access device fraud using stolen 
credit card information obtained from the reports.162 The Second Circuit 
held that the individual account holders affected by the crime were properly 
considered “victims” because there was evidence that they had to spend “an 
appreciable amount of time securing reimbursement for their financial 
losses from their banks or credit card companies”163—but it did not hold 
that the Credits Against Loss provision mandated such a result. 
In United States v. Adjei, the Third Circuit was faced with a defendant 
who had been convicted of “fil[ing] 175 false tax returns with the Internal 
Revenue Service . . . using stolen information from hospital patients,”164 
and, as a result of his conduct, “individual hospital patients had to engage in 
a long, drawn-out process to regain their identities and obtain proper tax 
returns.”165 The Third Circuit held that the individuals the defendant 
defrauded who “spent time or money seeking reimbursement” could qualify 
as “victims” as defined by Section 2B1.1(b)(2)—but, as in Abiodun, it did 
not hold that the Credits Against Loss provision mandated such a result.166 
Neither Adjei nor Abiodun held that reimbursed account holders 
categorically were, or were not, to be counted as “victims,” only that the 
account holders in these cases were to be counted as “victims” because they 
had suffered harm seeking reimbursement.167 Thus, both Adjei and Abiodun 
are not inconsistent with the Yagar qualifying explanation, despite counting 
reimbursed account holders as “victims” under 2B1.1(b)(2). However, in 
the 2009 opinion United States v. Stepanian, the First Circuit directly 
rejected Yagar’s reasoning in favor of Lee’s.168 
Defendant Stepanian had been convicted in a scheme whereby he and 
three co-conspirators secretly replaced payment terminals in Stop & Shop 
grocery stores with “altered terminals [that] were equipped with devices 
that recorded, or ‘skimmed,’ debit card numbers, PIN codes, and credit card 
numbers whenever customers swiped their cards to make purchases.”169 In 
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ruling that the account holders affected by his scheme were “victims,” the 
court placed great weight on the “declaration of victim losses”170 statements 
that had been filed in district court to conclude that they had suffered real 
economic loss during the period in which they were unable to access their 
funds,171 and held that such losses were within the “reasonably foreseeable 
pecuniary harm” intended by Section 2B1.1(b)(2).172 Significantly, 
Stepanian was the only circuit court decision in four years to directly reject 
Yagar in favor of Lee, holding that reimbursed account holders are 
necessarily counted as “victims” because the Credits Against Loss 
provision contemplates the existence of an initial loss despite any 
subsequent reimbursement.173 In Stepanian, counting the affected account 
holders as “victims” proportionately reflected the harm caused by the 
defendant’s conduct. However, in adopting Lee’s reasoning (which is now 
reflected by Amendment 726), Stepanian foreclosed the future possibility 
of excluding account holders that had not suffered harm through time lost 
seeking reimbursement from the “victims” calculation. 
Yagar, Conner, Orr, Pham, and Kennedy demonstrate the folly of such 
reasoning. In each of these cases the account holders at issue were found to 
have been rapidly reimbursed for their losses and thus had not suffered any 
“pecuniary harm” or “actual loss.”174 Despite this, Amendment 726 would 
now presuppose that these account holders had suffered harm seeking 
reimbursement and mandate that they be included in the 2B1.1(b)(2) 
“victims” calculation. While the Conner court did not see a justification for 
“stopping the clock,” Amendment 726 has no clock. Rather, it is 
constructed with an overbroad presumption that every victim of financial 
identity theft spends a significant amount of time seeking reimbursement.175 
Had Amendment 726 governed the cases of the defendants at issue in 
Yagar, Conner, Orr, Kennedy, and Pham, they would each have received 
upward sentencing enhancements that counted, as “victims,” account 
holders who were viewed by the sentencing court not to have suffered any 
significant adverse effect as a result of their crimes. Such a result is not in 
proportion to the harm suffered by those account holders and is contrary to 
the intended goals of the Guidelines. As evidenced by the opinions of the 
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Third, Second, and First Circuits—which found that account holders had 
suffered harm as a result of time lost seeking reimbursement—it is Yagar’s 
reasoning, not Lee’s or Amendment 726, that provides the proper rubric for 
determining whether time lost seeking reimbursement should be a factor 
that leads to an increase in a defendant’s recommended sentence.176 
2. Constructional Errors 
Amendment 726 contains two inherent constructional errors that are 
inconsistent with the proper operation of Section 2B1.1. The first is that 
Amendment 726 fails to address the “double-counting” that occurs when a 
reimbursed account holder and the financial institution that reimburses it 
are each included in the “victims” calculation—viz. the singular financial 
loss is ascribed to two separate “victims” and, thus, is counted twice in the 
“actual loss” calculation.177 This error is plain and has been adequately 
addressed by previous scholarship,178 so it will not be further expounded by 
this note. 
The second error relates to the relationship between the calculation of 
“actual loss” and “victims” under Section 2B1.1. For the purposes of 
Section 2B1.1(b)(1), where there is no “actual loss” there can be no 
“victim,” because under Section 2B1.1 calculation of “actual loss” and the 
identification of “victims” are two distinct and interdependent concepts.179 
If an individual has not suffered an “actual loss,” he is not a “victim,” and 
must not be counted as such under 2B1.1(b)(2). Despite this, Lee reasoned 
that, read in conjunction with the Credits Against Loss provision, the Actual 
Loss provision inherently recognizes that all reimbursed account holders 
suffer an initial loss, and should therefore be included in the “victims” 
calculation.180 This reasoning—adopted by the First Circuit in Stepanian, 
and implicitly adopted by Amendment 726—is, as articulated in Conner, 
Orr, and Armstead, patently unsound because it allows inclusion of account 
holders in the “victims” calculation without requiring that they be included 
in the “actual loss” calculation. 
This error was identified by the Ninth Circuit in Armstead, which held 
that it is wrong to count individuals who were fully reimbursed as “victims” 
“without regard to whether their losses were included in the loss 
                                                                                                                           
 176. This Note advocates for an Amendment that adopts Yagar’s reasoning but employs a 
departure application to account for the harm suffered by reimbursed account holders, rather than 
automatically counting them as “victims.” See discussion Part V infra. 
 177. Amendment 726 automatically includes reimbursed account holders in the “victims” 
calculation, regardless of whether or not they have suffered any harm, and thus is prone to double-
counting the reimbursed financial losses. E.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 448; Parsons, supra 
note 9, at 852. 
 178. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 450–51, 456–57. 
 179. E.g., United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Armstead, 
552 F.3d 769, 783 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 180. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005). 
2011] Calculating Reimbursed Victims 469 
calculation.”181 The Armstead court stated that although “persons who are 
reimbursed may suffer pecuniary harm,” the Lee court had conducted a 
backwards calculation by identifying “victims” before calculating “loss.”182 
Armstead held instead that “[a] court should analyze and quantify pecuniary 
harm when making the loss calculation, not when determining the number 
of victims.”183 Hence, “[o]nce a loss amount is included in the loss 
calculation, then the person associated with that loss should also be 
included in the victim calculation.”184 
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits also recognized this error. In Conner, the 
Firth Circuit rejected Lee’s reading of the Actual Loss Provision and denied 
that it should be read in conjunction with the Credits Against Loss 
provision, holding instead that individual account holders do not suffer 
“pecuniary harm at the moment the purchases [are] charged to their 
accounts. . . . [and] [i]t is a strained reading of [the Actual Loss provision] 
to say that the account holders suffered ‘pecuniary harm that resulted from 
the offense’” despite being fully reimbursed.185 The Conner court further 
stated that Lee’s “interpretation of the definition of ‘actual loss’ is not 
compatible with its plain meaning”186 because where account holders have 
been made pecuniarily whole by their reimbursements, they have not 
suffered an “actual loss.”187 Moreover, the Conner court found this 
reasoning to be improper because courts: 
should not look to a separate provision of the Application Notes to create 
an ambiguity . . . [because] there is no indication that use of the word 
“victim” [in the Credits Against Loss provision] was intended to modify 
the definition of the term as used in § 2B1.1(b)(2). . . . [and,][f]inally, [the 
Credits Against Loss provision] is about how to count “loss,” which is a 
related but distinct concept from “actual loss”—how the Application 
Notes instruct us to identity “victims.”188 
In Orr, the Tenth Circuit also rejected Lee’s reading of the Credits 
Against Loss provision in favor of Connor’s reading because “[the Credits 
Against Loss provision], by its own express terms, ‘applies to the 
determination of loss under subsection (b)(1),’” and calculating “loss” and 
identifying “victims” are “distinct concepts” for the purposes of Section 
2B1.1.189 Orr further rejected that there is a separate “initial loss” that can 
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be considered as opposed to the “actual loss” if the victim has been fully 
reimbursed.190 
Connor, Orr, and Armstead demonstrate that, as in Lee, Amendment 
726 will inherently violate the constructional design of the 2B1.1(b)(1) 
“actual loss” calculations by mandating that all reimbursed account holders 
be counted as “victims.” In addition, Amendment 726 fails to resolve 
Section 2B1.1’s “double-counting” issue for financial identity theft crimes. 
The solution proposed by this note will attempt to remedy these errors. 
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
As is made clear through the progression of the four-year circuit split, 
while the Federal Sentencing Commission has achieved greater sentencing 
consistency through adoption of Amendment 726, it has done so at the 
expense of sentencing proportionality and the proper operation of the 
2B1.1(b)(1) “actual loss” calculations, and has failed to remedy the risk of 
double-counting financial losses incurred as a result of financial identity 
theft. A superior resolution to the reimbursed victims issue is to implement: 
(1) an amendment to Section 2B1.1 specifically excluding reimbursed 
account holders from the definition of “victims” under 2B1.1 and 
specifically stating that time lost seeking reimbursement is not a “pecuniary 
harm”; and (2) a guided upward departure application modeled after the 
Yagar line of reasoning that takes into account time lost seeking 
reimbursement. 
The guided departure application should be incorporated into 
Application Note 19(A)(vi) of Section 2B1.1, which governs specific 
upward departure considerations for cases “involving access devices or 
unlawfully produced or unlawfully obtained means of identification.”191 It 
should be a fourth factor that a court may consider in deciding whether to 
apply an upward departure, and should read: “The offense caused a 
reimbursed account holder to spend a significant amount of time or effort 
seeking reimbursement for financial losses, or while repairing harm 
suffered as a result of the unauthorized dissemination of their means of 
identification.” This proposed departure application mirrors Yagar’s 
qualifying explanation in recognizing that reimbursed account holders do 
not necessarily suffer an “adverse effect” when their financial losses are 
short-lived, and explicitly provides for the inclusion of time or effort lost 
seeking reimbursement as harms that may be appropriately considered as 
sentencing enhancement factors. Notably, the term “account holder” should 
be used, as opposed to “victim,” because under this proposed amendment 
reimbursed account holders are not to be counted as “victims” under 
2B1.1(b)(2). 
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At the outset, it is important to note that departure applications are 
designed to govern exceptional circumstances,192 and in the case of 
financial identity theft crimes, the reimbursed victims issue is a nearly ever-
present norm, hardly the exception. At first blush, therefore, implementing 
a departure application to rectify the reimbursed victims issue might appear 
inappropriate. However, the benefits of implementing this guided departure 
application193—promoting sentencing proportionality for financial identity 
theft crimes, ensuring the proper operation of 2B1.1 “victims” and “actual 
loss” calculations, and remedying the risk of double-counting financial 
losses—far outweigh this slight constructional anomaly. 
This proposed solution will promote the Commission’s primary 
motivation in amending the definition of “victim” in Section 2B1.1(b)(2) to 
include individuals who have been fully reimbursed for their financial 
identity theft losses. Namely, because “such an individual, even if fully 
reimbursed, must often spend significant time resolving credit problems and 
related issues, and such lost time may not be adequately accounted for in 
the loss calculations under the guidelines.”194 The proposed solution is 
necessary to attain this goal because Amendment 726 does not adequately 
account for such lost time. Applied to either the case of an account holder 
who is immediately reimbursed, or to one who spends a significant amount 
of time seeking reimbursement, Amendment 726 produces inherently 
erroneous outcomes. Under Amendment 726, the harm suffered by an 
account holder who has lost large amounts of time seeking reimbursement 
is equated to that of an account holder who was immediately reimbursed 
and may not even have been aware of his financial loss.195 Thus, 
Amendment 726 suffers from an inherent lack of proportionality—a critical 
element of the Guidelines’ statutory intent—and the proposed amendments 
will remedy this. 
This proposal would also eliminate Amendment 726’s constructional 
errors. The risk of double-counting financial losses is eliminated because 
the proposed solution would mandate that reimbursed account holders not 
be counted as “victims” at sentencing. Thus, the financial losses incurred 
will only be ascribed to the entities that reimbursed the individual account 
holders. The proposed amendments will also restore the proper operation of 
the “actual loss” and “victims” calculations. Amendment 726 mandates that 
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an account holder whose means of identification is used unlawfully be 
included in the 2B1.1(b)(2) “victims” calculation, but gives no guidance as 
to how such lost time should be accounted for, if at all, in the 2B1.1(b)(1) 
“actual loss” calculation. As articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Armstead, 
“in order to be counted as a victim, a person must have sustained a loss that 
is ‘monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money’ and that loss 
must be included in the loss calculation.”196 Yet, Amendment 726 
presupposes that every reimbursed account holder has incurred such losses 
without providing a rubric for defining these losses in monetary terms. The 
proposal outlined here eliminates this quandary entirely. Under the 
proposed amendments, time lost seeking reimbursement need not be 
quantified and included in the “actual loss” calculation because the 
reimbursed account holders are not to be included in the “victims” 
calculation; yet, if they have suffered an adverse effect through time lost 
seeking reimbursement this harm will be reflected via the proposed 
departure application.197 
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